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Abstract—Recent trends in targeted cyber-attacks has in-
creased the interest of research in the field of cyber security.
Such attacks have massive disruptive effects on organizations,
enterprises and governments. Cyber kill chain is a model to
describe cyber-attacks so as to develop incident response and
analysis capabilities. Cyber kill chain in simple terms is an attack
chain, the path that an intruder takes to penetrate information
systems over time to execute an attack on the target. This
paper broadly categories the methodologies, techniques and tools
involved in cyber-attacks. This paper intends to help a cyber
security researcher to realize the options available to an attacker
at every stage of a cyber-attack.
Keywords—Reconnaissance, RAT, Exploit, Cyber Attack, Per-
sistence, Command & Control
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the leading problems faced by organizations is the
emergence of targeted attacks conducted by adversaries who
have easy access to sophisticated tools and technologies with
an aim at establishing a persistent and undetected presence in
the targeted cyber infrastructure. These multi-staged attacks are
now becoming more complex, involving vertical and horizontal
movement across multiple elements of the organization. The
security research community has given this multi-stage chain
of events culminating to cyber espionage a name: The Cyber
Kill Chain. This paper aims on providing a primer on the cyber
kill chain and surveys the recent trends and methodologies of
the attacker at each stage of the cyber kill chain.
The paper talks about attacks in general irrespective of
operating systems or application software since Cyber Kill
Chain is a process rather than a technology. Technologies
involved at each stage of the cyber kill chain process is
explained without going into much details.
The paper is organized into 4 sections. Section 2 introduces
the phases of cyber kill chain, section 3 discusses the technical
trends at each step of the cyber kill chain. The papers ends with
concluding remarks in section 4.
II. CYBER KILL CHAIN
Cyber kill chain is a model for incident response
team,digital forensic investigators and malware analysts to
work in a chained manner. Inherently understanding Cyber kill
chain is modeling and analyzing offensive actions of a cyber-
attacker[1]. So for a security analyst who develops defensive
counter measures[3], it is of utmost importance to study the
cyber kill chain. This knowledge can help one think on the
same lines of that of an attacker. Each phase of kill chain in
itself is a vast research area to tackle and analyze.
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Fig. 1: Phases of Cyber Kill Chain
In recent years, cyber attacks have been more com-
plex than it used to be and hence more destructive and
dangerous[14][41]. Nowadays multiple redundant attack vec-
tors are being exploited in cyber attacks to not only multiply
the effect but also making it more difficult for the response
team to analyze.
To analyze such attacks cyber kill chain provides a frame-
work to breakdown the complicated attack into mutually
nonexclusive stages or layers. Such a layered approach will
enable the analysts to tackle smaller and easier problems at
the same time and it will also help the defenders to subvert
each phase by developing defenses and mitigation for each
of the phases. Cyber Kill chain mainly consists of 7 phases
[5][6][8] as shown in Fig. 1.
There are many articles [2][4][7] which describe the cyber
kill chain in detail w.r.t. recent attacks but most of them don’t
discuss the tools and technologies used by the attacker at each
stage of the cyber kill chain. In next section we will go through
technical aspects involved at each step w.r.t to the attacker’s
perspective and will see the variety of tools and methodologies
utilized by attacker.
III. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF CYBER KILL CHAIN
As described cyber kill chain defines the flow of a cyber
attack and in this 7 layer model each layer is critical. Studying
the cyber kill chain will help cyber threats to be identified or
mitigated at any layer of attack. Sooner the detection is done
lesser is the loss to the organization under attack. This section
broadly outlines the technical methodologies, implementation,
research, and tools involved at each stage of the cyber kill
chain with examples of famous cyber attacks and malwares
used in the bygone years.
A. Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance means gathering information about the
potential target. Target can be an individual or an organiza-
tional entity. Reconnaissance can further be broken down to
target identification, selection and profiling. Reconnaissance in
cyber space mainly includes crawling World Wide Web such
as internet websites, conferences, blogs, social relationship,
mailing lists and network tracing tools to get information
about target. Information gathered from reconnaissance is used
in later stages of cyber kill chain to design and deliver the
payload. Reconnaissance is divided into 2 parts [9] (expected
to be done in order):
1) Passive Reconnaissance:It is gathering the informa-
tion about target without letting him know about it.
2) Active Reconnaissance:It is much deeper profiling
of target which might trigger alert to the target.
Reconnaissance
Techniques
Type of
Reconnais-
sance
Techniques Used[10]
[11]
1 Target Identifi-
cation and Se-
lection
passive Domain Names, whois,
records from APNIC,
RIPE, ARIN
2 Target Profiling
(a) Target So-
cial Profiling
Passive Social Networks, Pub-
lic Documents, Reports
and Corporate Web-
sites
(b) Target Sys-
tem Profiling
Active Pingsweeps,
Fingerprinting, Port
Scanning and services
3 Target Valida-
tion
Active SPAM Messages,
Phishing Mails and
Social Engineering
TABLE I: Reconnaissance Techniques
Reconnaissance provides knowledge about potential targets
which will enable the attacker to decide the type of weapon
suitable for target, type of delivery methods possible (Table
III), malware installation difficulties and security mechanisms
that need to be bypassed. We will now see how the information
gathered by reconnaissance is used to develop sophisticated
malware.
B. Weaponize
Weaponize stage of the cyber kill chain deals with
designing a backdoor and a penetration plan, utilizing
the information gathered from reconnaissance, to enable
successful delivery of the backdoor. Technically it is binding
software/application exploits with a remote access tool
(RAT). Weaponizing involves design and development of the
following two components:-
1) RAT (Remote Access Tool): RAT is piece of software
which executes on target’s system and give remote, hidden
and undetected access to the attacker. RAT is usually called
the payload of a cyber-weapon. The target system can be a
computer, mobile[13] or any embedded device provided the
RAT software is properly compiled for the architecture being
targeted. The types of access provided by a typical RAT are
system explore, File upload or download, remote file execution,
keylogs, screen capture, webcam or system power on/off with
limited or user level privileges. If by some mechanism the RAT
gets administrator/root access then it could include network
spreading [1] or network data capture access or persistent
installation of anti-detection module. RAT again constitutes
of two major parts:
a) Client: Client is the piece of code which is delivered
to the target, executes and creates connection to the Command
and Control infrastructure of the RAT. After establishing
connection, the client receives the command from its controller.
Client in turn executes the command and sends the results
back. It is not always necessary to have all RAT functionalities
in a single deliverable. There are many instances of RAT like
Carberp [14], Ventir Trojan [15],Poison Ivy [42] etc. where
RAT functions are delivered to the target in a modular manner
by using a very basic stub. The complied code can be deployed
in form of binaries or shellcodes. Shellcode in simplistic terms
is position independent machine code generally compiled by
assemblers. There also exists techniques [16] which use spe-
cially crafted C-language source codes to generate shellcode.
b) Server: Server is the other half of RAT which runs
on the Command and Control infrastructure with nice UI,
displays the connection information from target’s client part.
Server typically has options of commands like keylogger, file
browser, screen capture etc. Based on objective attacker gives
the command to the client using server interface which is
executed by client and the output is returned back to the server.
Depending on execution permission level being allotted to the
client part these commands can be executed to get full access
of target’s system.
While developing RATs major constraints are size, Anti-
virus detection, extendibility, and scalability and user friendly
interface. Ease of use of a RAT is defined by the server UI,
hence a big part of RAT programing is dedicated to UI design
of server.
It is not necessary to code client and server in same
language. These days server are using either scripting lan-
guages(PHP, Javascript) for web based UI [14] [41] or
C++,Java, delphi [17][42] for application based interface.
Famous RATs Famous Exploit Kits
[13]
Blackshades Blackhole
DarkComet Nuclear
Poison ivy Styx
Bozok Redkit
Njrat Sweet Orange
Apocalypse Infinity
TABLE II: RATs and Exploit Kits
2) Exploit: Exploit is the part of weapon which facilitates
the RAT to execute. Exploit acts as a carrier for RAT and
uses system/software vulnerability to drop and execute RAT.
Major objective to use exploit is to evade user attention while
establishing a silent backdoor access using RAT. Exploits can
be of many form like MS Office documents (.doc/ppt) e.g.
CVE-2010-3333, CVE-2014-4114, PDF Documents e.g. CVE-
2014-9165, CVE-2013-2729, audio/video file e.g. CVE 2013-
3245 or web page e.g.CVE-2012-1876, CVE-2014-6332 [18]
etc. If target opens any of such files using vulnerable software
RAT will be installed on targets system. After getting RAT
installed more exploits like privilege escalation exploits like
CVE-2015-002, CVE-2013-3660 are used on target to get
higher privileges which can be used for spreading of RAT,
persistent access or for destruction of complete system.
Without exploit also there are methods to compromise the
target using only RAT but those methods are highly unreliable
and not effective these days because of security awareness
among users. Embedding RAT in legitimate software exe-
cutable, sharing via social engineering and faking RAT as
genuine image/audio/video files are some of such methods
which used in wild in previous years[41].
C. Delivery
Delivery is the critical part of cyber kill chain which is
responsible for an efficient and effective cyber-attack. For any
cyber-attack it is preferable to have target information to ensure
a successful attack. In most of the cyber-attacks it is mandatory
to have some kind of user interaction like downloading and
executing malicious files or visiting malicious web pages on
internet. There are some attacks which are performed without
user interaction by exploiting network devices e.g. CVE-2014-
3306, CVE-2014-9583[18]. When it is clear that target has to
interact, it is obvious that attack should have ability to attract
and entice the target to interact. This affinity comes from the
active and passive reconnaissance.
Delivery is a high risk task for attacker because delivery
leaves traces. Therefore most of the attacks are performed
anonymously using paid anonymous services, compromised
websites and compromised email accounts.
While delivering the weapon multiple delivery methods
are also used because no single method can guarantee 100%
success. Failed attacks sometimes are very useful to get basic
information about target’s system information. Such types
of information gathering mechanisms are very common in
browser based attack where user visits the malicious web page
which first try to get user system information and accordingly
deliver the weapon[20].
Delivery
Mechanism [1][12]
Characteristics
1 Email Attachments Email content is composed to en-
tice the user by using appealing
content
3 Phishing Attacks Sensitive information like user-
names, passwords, credit card de-
tails etc. are extracted by mas-
querading a trustworthy entity in
communication.[19]
4 Drive by Download Target is forced to download ap-
pealing malicious content from in-
ternet. Malicious content could be
a image file, pdf/word document or
software setup file
5 USB/Removal Me-
dia
Infected files are kept in Re-
movable media which afterwards
silently infects other systems open-
ing the files.
6 DNS Cache Poi-
soning
Vulnerabilities in DNS are ex-
ploited to divert internet traffic
from legitimate servers to attacker
controlled destinations.
TABLE III: Delivery Mechanisms
D. Exploitation
After delivering the cyber weapon, then as expected the
target completes the required user interaction and weapon
executes at the target side. On execution, the next step is
triggering the exploit. The objective of an exploit is to silently
install/execute the payload. To trigger the exploit there are
certain conditions that need to be matched:
1) User must be using the software/Operating System
for which exploit has been created
2) The software/Operating System should not be up-
dated or upgraded to the versions wherein exploit
doesnt work.
3) Anti-Viruses or any other security mechanism should
not detect the exploit or payload neither in statically
nor dynamically during run time.
If all these conditions are fulfilled then exploit is triggered
and it will successfully install/execute the payload in target’s
system. Payload will connect to its Command and Control
counterpart to inform about successful execution and wait for
further commands to execute.
It is clear that exploit is the most critical part of the chain
technically. What is an exploit and how does attacker find such
exploits is the next question here.
Exploits are made using vulnerability of softwares publicly
identified as CVE[18]. Vulnerability is the software bug which
can result in potential threat to the system. And a bug is an un-
expected condition in which a program/software misbehaves.
Generally while programming lot of efforts is made to avoid
such conditions by writing every possible use case, exception
handling for all types of inputs, blocking invalid input etc.
But most of the times not all cases are covered because of
vast variety of user input/interaction. Therefore such invalid
or wrong input forces the program to misbehave and this
misbehavior is defined as type of vulnerability as mentioned
in Table IV.
Vulnerability are further analyzed by exploit writers to
see the possibility to carry and execute a payload. Not all
vulnerabilities are exploitable. Some of them are just crashes
or DoS or limited execution of program. It means not all
vulnerabilities result into exploitable crashes.
Category of
Exploits
Type of Exploit Type of Vulnerability
[21]
1 Operating
System
Level
Exploits
Kernel Exploits,
Device Driver
Exploits
• Denial-of-
Services
• Remote or
Local Code
Execution
2 Network
Level
Exploits
Protocol exploits
for FTP, SMTP,
NTP, SSH, Router
exploits,
• Privilege Es-
calation
3 Application/
Software
Exploits
Browser Exploits,
MS Office exploits,
PDF Exploits,
Java/Flash Exploits
Memory Corruption:
• Dangling
Pointer
• Buffer Over-
flow
• Use-After-
Free
TABLE IV: Exploits
Regarding the interest that how these vulnerabilities are dis-
covered following papers[22] [23] [24] describe details about
fuzzing. Fuzzing is methodology to give customized input to
the program and monitoring the output for abnormal behavior.
This abnormal behavior is further analyzed w.r.t. given input
to describe vulnerability and so to create exploits.
As mentioned in Delivery sectio sometimes just one de-
livery method is not sufficient, in the same way not just one
exploit is sufficient to attack multiple users specifically during
mass attacks. Generally combination of exploits, called an
Exploit Kit, is used for this purpose. As the name suggests
Exploit Kit is a collection of multiple exploits for various
versions of software. As an example for browser based attacks
an exploit kit may have exploits for various versions of Google
Chrome, Firefox and internet explorer. During delivery if
target uses vulnerable version of any of listed browser for
which exploit is available in exploit kit it will be delivered
accordingly.
E. Installation
Host based security measures have grown leaps and bounds
compared to other security mechanisms. This in turn has
spurned innovation in procedures that circumvent host-based
security controls to install, update and regulate the control of
the malware installed upon the victims computing device. Tra-
ditionally, a computer would become infected by an infection
vector like infected removable media, which in turn will leave
a malware executable in some unusual location and modify
registry/startup settings so that the malware executable is run
everytime the computer boots up. Some user eventually will
report this executable to antivirus vendor, who in turn will
analyze it and come up with a signature to detect it and in
some cases a removal tool. Modern malwares are not that
simple anymore [47]. Malware nowadays are multi staged and
they heavily rely on droppers and downloaders to deliver the
malware modules in a much more sophisticated manner.
• Dropper is a program that will install and run the
malware to a target system. Before executing the
malware code, dropper nowadays tries disabling host
based security controls at the target and hides the
installed malware.
• Downloaders were designed to perform the same
actions as Droppers disabling the victims security
and monitoring software, hiding core components and
obfuscating the infection vector, etc. but tended to be
smaller than Droppers because they did not contain
the core malicious library components. Instead of
unpacking an embedded copy of the core malware
agent, the downloader would connect to a remote file
repository and download the core components.
Today’s installation life-cycle incorporates many checks, bal-
ances and resilience features as a means of maximizing the
success of the installation, and protecting the participating
attackers. Following are some techniques that malware authors
use for covert persistent and anonymous installations.
• Anti-Debugger and Anti-Emulation: Dropper and
downloader components are typically armored. Using
a variety of packers, crypters and inspection-detection
engines, malware authors can ensure that common
debugger and emulation analysis techniques will not
work. The addition of advanced anti-virtual machine
analysis technologies also deters malware analysis to
a high extent.
• Anti-Antivirus: Many malware packages include
toolsets for automatically disabling host-based de-
tection technologies disabling anti-virus and IDS
products installed on the victim’s computer, changing
local DNS settings to ensure that no future updates to
the operating system or packages are possible, and
adding tools that recheck and re-disable protection
settings frequently.
• Rootkit and Bootkit Installation: Rootkits are pro-
grams which hide the executed payload. Payload file
hiding, process hiding are the core functionalities
of a rootkit e.g. LRK,AFX,Mebroot [27]. Similarly
Bootkits are malwares that are able to hook and patch
system to get loaded into the system Kernel, and
thus getting unrestricted access to the entire system.
Bootkits like Stoned Bootkit [28] modify the MBR or
boot sector for its execution to avoid protections from
operating system.
• Targeted Delivery:By performing a quick inventory
of the victim’s machine at the dropper/downloader
stage and submitting this information to the mal-
ware distribution site, the attackers can verify that
the compromised computer is real (and not some
analysis system) and respond accordingly. In some
cases, upon discovering that the victim was faked or
is an automated analysis system, the attackers would
not serve the core malware.
• Host-Based Encrypted Data Exfiltration: Most mal-
ware does not encrypt outbound network communica-
tion. Critical data stolen from the victim’s computer
is typically packed and file-encrypted at the host-
level before sending over a clear text network protocol
such as HTTP and SMTP thereby evading anomaly
detection systems and data-leakage prevention systems
(DLP)[47]
F. Command and Control
An important part of the remotely executed cyber-attacks is
the Command and Control(C&C) system. C&C system is used
to give remote covert instructions to compromised machines.
It also acts as the place where all data can be exfiltrated.
Over the years, the architecture of C&C channels have evolved
exponentially owing to the exponential development of defen-
sive mechanisms, namely antiviruses, firewalls, IDSs, etc [32].
There are mainly three type of C&C communication structures,
namely the traditional centralized structure, the newer peer-to-
peer decentralized architecture and the latest Social Networks
based structure.
• Centralized Structure: Traditionally malware de-
pended upon a classical client server model wherein
a central server is used to command and control the
infected machines. Since there is only one server,
its easy to manage. Also there is no dependence
on the infected machines to relay command control
signals. Hence failure of random infected machines
wont affect C&C architecture. But the number of
bots that can be controlled depends is constrained by
the hardware/software resources available to the C&C
server. Also taking down the server strategically will
shutdown the entire C&C infrastructure.
• Decentralized Structure:Owing to the fact that cen-
tralized architecture can be taken down easily and
cannot control a large botnet, malware authors started
using peer-to-peer P2P architecture for command-and-
control. The main aims of using this architecture are
scalability (infected machines are used as nodes, and
each node in turn is responsible only for a subset of
the total botnet), fault tolerance (redundant commu-
nication links can be formed to route information)
and P2P nature (decentralized architecture removes
the significant single point dependence of centralized
architectures). Variety of options for P2P e.g. Bit tor-
rent, Gnutella, Kademilia etc. indicates the substantive
depth of design possibilities. Eg. Storm [33]
• Social Networks Based Structure:Social networks
now play a huge part in many peoples lives. Facebook
has 1.35 billion registered users as of third quarter of
2014 [34]. Most of the social network services are free
to use and these services are deemed to be benign
in most organizational security policies. Owing to
these reasons, social media has now become a viable
option for malware authors. These high availability
and reliable social networks are used to pass on
information in a centralized/decentralized way to the
infected machines. Eg. Taidoor [35]
C&C Communication Traffic analysis is a traditional tech-
nique to detect communication pattern among infected ma-
chines. As a result malware creators have adopted techniques
to hide communication patterns. Anonymous communication
techniques involve creating an unobservable communication
channel that is resistant to traffic analysis. Unobservable com-
munication channel refers to the communication capability that
a third party cannot distinguish between a communication
and non-communicating entity. It will be indistinguishable
from legitimate traffic. Following is a review of techniques
employed by the malware creators to achieve unobservable
anonymous communication channel:
• IRC Chats:Internet Relay Chat(IRC)[36] was devel-
oped in 1988 and is a protocol used for text chat over
the internet. Its primary function is to provide chan-
nels which are chat rooms allowing for public/private
conversations. These channels were exploited by mal-
wares to send and receive information once infection
takes place.
• TCP/HTTP/FTP: Malwares relying on IRC as C&C
channel were now easier to detect at network gate-
ways. Malware authors circumvented this by employ-
ing TCP/HTTP/FTP[37] [38] [39] as C&C channels.
Since majority of applications in all the operating
systems use these channels for benign communication,
malware traffic becomes indistinguishable. Examples
: Zeus, Poison Ivy[41] [42]
• Steganography:Steganography technique involves
hiding data inside images, video, audio or any such
content which are hosted in attacker controlled harm-
less websites. The data is then hidden in specially
constructed and encrypted inline annotations which
are strewn randomly all over the page or extra spurious
bytes of images. This hidden data can contain C&C
commands like ip addresses of C&C server, shellcode
commands to execute etc
• TOR:Tor (originally The Onion Router) is a service
used to provide anonymity over the internet[ar09].
Tor directs Internet traffic through a free, world-
wide, volunteer network consisting of more than six
thousand relays to conceal a user’s location and us-
age from anyone conducting network surveillance or
traffic analysis.. Apart from providing an anonymity
network, Tor also has Hidden Service Protocol which
makes it possible for users to hide their location while
offering various kinds of public services.. Hidden
services work by setting up Rendezvous points which
are identified by .onion links. SDC Botnet [43] is a
recent example of malwares employing TOR as C&C
channel.
Attackers would like to stay undetected and covert for as long
as possible. Following are 3 techniques commonly used by
malware authors to hide their C&C server from the defense
mechanisms of any organization:
• DNS Fast Flux:The Domain Name Service(DNS)[44]
is a naming system of computers on the internet. DNS
is not required to match hostnames to ip addresses
in a one-to-one fashion. A single hostname may
correspond to many IP addresses to facilitate fault
tolerance and load distribution Malware authors use
a technique called fast-flux to hide C&C locations be-
hind an rapidly changing(fast-flux) network of infected
machines. This is achieved by setting a very short
TTL(time-to-live) to DNS response which is known
as single flux. Another technique called double flux
is used which works by switching rapidly through
multiple infected nodes addresses which in turn act
as a proxy relay location to the original C&C Site.
• DNS as a medium:It is also possible to use DNS
system as a communication mechanism rather than
using it for setting up the channel. RDATA field of a
DNS response can be of variable length and multiple
formats. One of these is TXT, which can be used
to transfer actual text. The commands are can be
encoded into base64 and sent over the RDATA field.
Feederbot[46] is one such example.
• Domain Generation Algorithms: Another method to
stay under the radar is DGA. DGA programmatically
generates pseudo random domain names which is
used as address of C&C server. IT is then upto the
attacker to ensure he controls the domains that will be
generated. Conficker malware for example, generates
250 domain names by using current UTC date as the
seed of pseudo random DGA. The same domains are
generated every 3 hours. All the 250 domain names
are queried until one of them resolves successfully.
[45]
G. Act on Objectives
After getting the communication setup with target system
attacker executes the commands. The command used by at-
tacker depends on interest of attack. [48]
1) Mass attack: Objective of mass attack to get as many
targets as possible. In mass attack more than a single
system multiple systems together are of interest. Most
of such attacks aims for getting bank, email, social
media and local system administrator credentials[49].
Bigger picture of mass attack is called BOTNets[50].
BOTNets are mainly used for DDos attacks and
virtual coin mining. Virtual coin mining harvest the
system processors or GPU to generate virtual cur-
rency for the attacker.
2) Targeted attacks: Target attacks are more sophisti-
cated and carried with more caution. Most of such
attacks are aimed to get confidential or secret in-
formation from target system. Data exfiltration and
getting user credentials for online accounts are ob-
jective of the attacks. Spreading through the network
also becomes the primary goal when target is an
organization.
In both types of attack if attack is intended for destructive
purpose it may crash system hard drive or device drivers.
Attacker may make CPU to use its maximum capability for
long time to damage the processor hardware.
IV. SUMMARY
In this paper cyber kill has been discussed in detail with
its technical aspects. The paper gives technical flow from
attacker’s perspective which may help security researcher to
design prevention mechanisms.This paper explores the recent
trends in malware development by reviewing weaponize and
installation techniques. Delivery and Exploitation section gives
an insight to the importance of software vulnerabilities, both
from an attacker and security researcher’s perspective, in the
current cyberspace.Study of reconnaissance techniques and
Command & Control infrastructure shows how benign features
of network protocols are being misused to achieve nefarious
end results.
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